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Much literature compares the efficiency properties of environmental policies, generally finding that incentives like taxes or permits are more cost-effective 
than mandates—at least in the case where firms are heterogeneous and govern-
ment cannot tailor mandates to each firm. In contrast, the literature on distributional 
effects is limited. Some papers identify demographic characteristics or locations of 
households that are differentially affected by environmental protection, while others 
look at the burdens on households that buy products made more expensive.1 All of 
these papers ignore effects of environmental policies on the wage rate and the return 
to capital—both of which also affect real incomes. Yet, restrictive command and 
control (CAC) regulations can simultaneously affect both product prices and factor 
prices.
Of course, the public economics literature since Arnold C. Harberger (1962) is 
replete with analytical general equilibrium studies of tax incidence. A few papers 
look at incidence of environmental taxes, where the question is about how the burden 
of collecting the revenue is distributed.2 Mandates do not have revenue for which the 
1 Examples in the first category include Randy A. Becker (2004) and Holger Sieg et al. (2004). Those in the 
second category include Leonard P. Gianessi and Henry M. Peskin (1980), H. David Robison (1985), Gilbert E. 
Metcalf (1999), or Sarah E. West and Roberton C. Williams III (2004).
2 The incidence of a pollution tax is studied by, e.g., Gary Yohe (1979), A. Lans Bovenberg and Lawrence H. 
Goulder (1997), Swee Chua (2003), and Fullerton and Heutel (2007).
* Fullerton: Finance Department and Institute of Government and Public Affairs, University of Illinois, 4030 
BIF Box #30 (MC520), 515 East Gregory Drive, Champaign, IL 61820 (e-mail: dfullert@illinois.edu); Heutel: 
Department of Economics, University of North Carolina at Greensboro, PO Box 26165, Greensboro, NC 27402-
6170 (e-mail: gaheutel@uncg.edu). We are grateful for funding from the University of Texas, the National Science 
Foundation (NSF), and Japan’s Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI). For helpful suggestions, we thank 
Spencer Banzhaf, Larry Goulder, Carol McAusland, Hilary Sigman, Kerry Smith, Rob Williams, and many seminar 
participants.
† To comment on this article in the online discussion forum, or to view additional materials, visit the articles 
page at http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/pol.2.3.64.
The General Equilibrium Incidence
of Environmental Mandates†
By Don Fullerton and Garth Heutel*
Pollution regulations affect factor demands, relative returns, produc-
tion, and output prices. In our model, one sector includes pollution 
as an input that can be a complement or substitute for labor or capi-
tal. For each type of mandate, we find conditions where more burden 
is on labor or on capital. Stricter regulation does not always place 
less burden on the better substitute for pollution. Also, restrictions on 
pollution per unit output create an “output-subsidy effect” on factor 
prices that can reverse the usual output and substitution effects. We 
find analogous effects for a restriction on pollution per unit capital. (JEL H23, Q53, Q58)
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burden can be distributed. Yet CAC mandates clearly interfere with firms’ decisions 
about use of labor, use of capital, the amount to produce, and the price to charge. 
We therefore find it surprising that we cannot find any analytical general equilib-
rium model of the incidence of nonrevenue-raising environmental regulations, with 
simultaneous effects on the sources side (relative factor prices) and the uses side 
(product prices).3 Computable general equilibrium (CGE) models calculate effects 
of regulations on factor prices as well as goods prices.4 These CGE studies can 
provide elaborate simulations with numerical magnitudes, and some include simple 
analytical models. But none provides a general analytical model with closed form 
solutions for any parameter values that show effects of mandates on the wage, return 
to capital, and output prices.
To begin such a literature, this paper starts with rudimentary models in the style 
of Harberger (1962), with two competitive sectors and constant returns to scale, 
but we add the important complication that the “dirty” sector uses three inputs: 
labor, capital, and pollution. Thus, any two inputs can be complements or substi-
tutes. The “clean” sector uses only labor and capital, which are in fixed supply, but 
perfectly mobile between sectors. We then solve models representing multiple types 
of nonrevenue-raising policies, including a “relative” standard on pollution per unit 
of output, and a relative standard on pollution per unit of an input (such as capital).
In this simple model with perfect certainty, a mandate to restrict the quantity of 
pollution raises the pollution price in a way that is fundamentally similar to a pol-
lution tax. Since the tax is analyzed in Fullerton and Heutel (2007), we relegate 
to the Appendix our analyses of quantity restrictions (permits or quotas). The key 
intuition for these quantity restrictions, however, is that their incidence on labor or 
capital may be understood using the same two effects already identified by Peter M. 
Mieszkowski (1967). First, the “substitution effect” raises the return to whichever 
factor is a better substitute for pollution (and injures the relative complement to pol-
lution). Second, the “output effect” reduces the return to whichever factor is used 
intensively in the regulated sector.
We then extend the simple model to consider relative standards. Often regula-
tors limit the ratio of emissions to output, a restriction that firms can meet partly by 
reducing emissions in the numerator and partly by increasing output in the denomi-
nator. We derive closed form solutions for each price change, and we identify an 
additional term we call the “output-subsidy effect.” This effect helps whichever fac-
tor is intensively used in the dirty sector, and it dominates the usual output effect 
under plausible conditions we identify. The important point is that government-
imposed costs on the dirty sector may place less burden on the factor intensively 
used there. Finally, we model a restriction on the ratio of emissions to capital, where 
solutions are used to identify another new term we call the “capital-subsidy effect.” 
Since this restriction can be satisfied partly by increased use of capital, this effect 
3 In an analytical trade model with fixed output prices, Monica Das and Sandwip K. Das (2007) show the effect 
on factor prices from one type of mandate (a pollution quota). Here, we find both factor prices and output prices in 
a closed economy for multiple types of mandates. Yet results would differ in open economy.
4 Examples include Michael Hazilla and Raymond J. Kopp (1990); Dale W. Jorgenson and Peter J. Wilcoxen 
(1990); Goulder, Ian W. H. Parry, and Dallas Burtraw (1997); Goulder et al. (1999); Burtraw et al. (2001); V. Kerry 
Smith et al. (2004); Carolyn Fischer and Alan K. Fox (2007); and Jared C. Carbone and Smith (2008).
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tends to raise the relative return to capital (or, more generally, the return to any input 
in the denominator of the restricted ratio). We also find effects on the output prices 
to show burdens on the uses side of income.
Thus, we see standard principles of tax incidence at play, many of which have 
been known since Harberger (1962), but we introduce other effects specific to man-
dates. And this analysis can be applied beyond environmental policy to any restric-
tion on use of inputs. For example, our three inputs could be interpreted as labor, 
capital, and land. Then agricultural policy may restrict use of land per unit output, or 
urban zoning rules may restrict building heights (capital per unit land).5
Section I reviews mandates in actual policymaking, and it reviews some of the 
 literature analyzing them. Section II then introduces our model. Section III consid-
ers a restriction on pollution per unit of output, and Section IV restricts pollution 
per unit input. Section V provides numerical magnitudes, and Section VI offers con-
cluding remarks.
I. Review of Environmental Mandates and Modeling
Since the beginning, environmental regulations have most often been command-
and-control (CAC) mandates rather than incentives like taxes or tradable permits. 
Those mandates, though, can take many forms for different industries. Historically, 
the Water Quality Act of 1965 was the first policy requiring that states set water 
quality standards, determine maximum discharge limits, and allocate nontradable 
quotas. Thus, it is an absolute quantity restriction. Then the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act of 1972 authorized the EPA to set effluent standards based on tech-
nological factors. Each facility faced restrictions based on the type of facility and 
perhaps on capital use or output.
The 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA) set national ambient air quality 
standards. States that do not meet them are forced to create specific implementa-
tion plans. These plans differ greatly from each other. The Clean Air Act is hard to 
model simply, except perhaps for new facilities under the New Source Performance 
Standards of the 1970 CAAA. Like the water standards, these air pollution regula-
tions are technology-based, that is, determined by the current state of abatement 
technology. Recently, tradable emissions permits are becoming more popular, 
including the 1990 CAAA US market for sulfur dioxide (SO2) and the market in the 
northeast for nitrogen oxide (NOX).
While quotas and permits set the absolute quantity of emissions, other mandates 
set emissions per unit of output or per unit of some input. This approach may be 
seen as more reasonable than absolute limits, especially when firm sizes differ. A 
regulator would not expect a large firm and small firm to have the same emissions. 
By enacting a relative policy, the regulator can avoid deciding on a specific alloca-
tion of emissions. Because of the variety of mandates under different state plans, 
5 Some have studied general equilibrium impacts of land use regulations (e.g., Robert E. Lucas, Jr. and Esteban 
Rossi-Hansberg 2002) and the effect of zoning constraints on the ratio of land to structure (e.g., Richard Arnott 
2005, Alain Bertaud and Jan K. Brueckner 2005). These papers consider some forms of redistribution, such as 
effects on land prices across locations, but they do not consider distributional effects on returns to capital and labor.
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it is difficult to say what policies have this relative form. In a survey of regulators, 
however, 97 percent of air pollution agencies and 100 percent of water agencies said 
they use limits on emissions per unit of some input, and 70 percent of air and 50 per-
cent of water agencies said they limit emissions per unit output (Clifford S. Russell, 
Winston Harrington, and William J. Vaughan 1986, 19). Such large proportions sug-
gest modeling some policies as limits on ratios of pollution to output or to an input.
Current regulations are complex. Table 1 summarizes how various environmental 
policies fall into three categories: limits on emissions quantities, standards on emis-
sions per unit output, and standards on emissions per unit input. Permit systems 
appear in the first column as limits on quantity. In the second column, an example 
is for producers of sulfuric acid, whose emissions of SO2 are limited to 2 kg per 
metric ton of acid produced. In the third column, Texas and federal limits on elec-
tricity generation apply to emissions of particulate matter per unit heat input (e.g., 
43 nanograms per joule of heat).
We cannot incorporate all of these different types of mandates in a single model 
with clear analytical results. We can, however, model a few types of mandates and 
compare results, to see their differential impacts. For example, we model technol-
ogy mandates and per facility standards as limits on the amount of pollution per unit 
capital. Our model can also be applied to other policies such as the limit on fertilizer 
per hectare, by reinterpreting our input of “capital” as input of “land.”
The economics literature often uses a tax on pollution to summarize the effects 
of all environmental policies. Some papers look at quotas or permits that restrict 
absolute amounts of pollution. Yet actual policy rarely employs a pollution tax, and 
mandates typically restrict emissions per unit output or per unit of an input. The few 
Table 1—Summary of Alternative Types of Environmental Mandates
Emissions quantity limits
(whether tradable or not)
“Performance standards”
(emissions per unit output)
“Technology mandates”
(emissions per unit of input)
1990 CAAA Title IV, market for SO2 
emissions
VOC standard for automobile refinish 
coating (grams per liter of coating)
Particulate matter, fossil-fuel-fired steam 
generators, Texasa and Federalb 
South Coast Air Quality Management 
District permit system, 1994
SO2 emissions for producers of sulfuric 
acidc
SO2 emissions for oil and gas producers, 
New York,d Texase (25 tons/year per 
facility)
NOX and VOC emissions credit 
program, 1989
Hazardous waste generators in Texasf Iron and steel processes, New Yorkg
European Union Emissions Trading 
System (EU-ETS)
Fluoride emissions for New York 
aluminum reduction plantsh
Agricultural policies that limit nitrogen 
per hectare
CO2 permit allocation partly based on 
output (in Europe and proposed in the 
United States)i 
Fuel economy standards are set per 
vehicle, energy efficiency per appliance
Renewable portfolio standards for 
electricity
Building codes are rules that apply per 
unit capital.
a Texas Administrative Code, Title 30, Section 1, §117.105 and §112.8.
b Code of Federal Regulations, Title 40, Chapter 1, §60.42.
c Code of Federal Regulations, Title 40, Chapter 1, §60.82.
d New York Environmental Conservation Rules and Regulations §223.3.
e Texas Administrative Code, Title 30, Section 1, §106.352.
f Texas Administrative Code, Title 30, Section 1, §335.69. 
g New York Environmental Conservation Rules and Regulations, §216.3.
h New York Environmental Conservation Rules and Regulations §209.2. 
i For the European Union Emission Trading System (EU-ETS), see Christoph Bohringer and Andreas Lange (2005). Regarding 
proposals in the United States, see Richard G. Newell and Willian A. Pizer (2008) and James Bushnell and Yihsu Chen (2009).
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studies of relative standards are focused on economic efficiency, not distributional 
effects.6
The most exhaustive theoretical analysis of different environmental mandates is 
in Gloria Helfand (1991). Her output uses a “dirty” input and a “clean” input. The 
mandates considered are: a limit on emissions, a limit on output, an upper limit on 
the dirty input, a lower limit on the clean input, and limits on the ratio of emissions 
to output or to an input. She compares their effects on output, each input, and firm 
profits. She finds that the output restriction most reduces input and output levels. 
The restriction on pollution itself yields the highest profits. In most cases, the signs 
of these changes depend on the form of production. One counterintuitive result is 
that a standard per unit output may actually increase total emissions; the same result 
may occur from a limit on total output.7
While Helfand (1991) provides a number of valuable insights regarding the dif-
ferences among various mandates, she does not address incidence.8 In fact, her input 
supply curves are horizontal, so no policy can affect factor prices. Furthermore, the 
two inputs are a clean and dirty input. Even as these two input prices change, the 
implications are unclear for returns to labor and capital. Here, we model production 
as using capital, labor, and pollution. These inputs have endogenous prices, so we 
capture the differential effects of environmental standards on their relative returns.
II. The Basic Model
Our model is similar to that in Fullerton and Heutel (2007), where we analyze 
a tax on emissions. For ease of exposition, we start here with the simplest version 
where emissions, Z, have a price, pZ, which directly applies to a policy of tradable 
permits. The following two sections then explain changes necessary to model each 
mandate. In this model, as in many papers since Harberger (1962), we assume a 
closed economy with many identical firms, perfect competition, fixed factor sup-
plies, perfect mobility, and no uncertainty.9 We compare two equilibria rather than 
6 Eithan Hochman and David Zilberman (1978) model standards as limits on emissions per unit output or per 
unit input. Jon D. Harford and Gordon Karp (1983) compare the two policies and find that a standard per unit 
output is more efficient than a standard per unit input. Similarly, Vinod Thomas (1980) compares the welfare costs 
of different policies. Fullerton and Metcalf (2001) model a technology restriction as a limit per unit output. Per 
G. Fredriksson, Herman R. J. Vollebergh, and Elbert Dijkgraaf (2004) model environmental policy as a limit on 
the energy-capital ratio, citing the Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards. None of these studies investigate 
distributional impacts.
7 Recently, Jyh-Bang Jou (2004) finds that quotas can cut pollution more than emissions/output standards. Also, 
Goulder et al. (1999) compare efficiency of environmental policies in the presence of distortionary taxes. Ross 
McKitrick (2001) solves for efficiency costs of ratio standards. In a political economy model, Toke Skovsgaard 
Aidt and Jayasri Dutta (2004) find that increasingly high environmental goals lead to greater use of incentives. See 
Nathaniel O. Keohane, Richard L. Revesz, and Robert N. Stavins (1998) for a similar model of policy choice. Juan-
Pablo Montero (2002) compares effects on research and development (R&D) incentives, while Till Requate and 
Wolfram Unold (2003) compare incentives to adopt abatement technology. Bovenberg, Goulder, and Derek Gurney 
(2005) see how efficiency costs are affected by a constraint to avoid adverse distributional effects.
8 Helfand and Brett W. House (1995) empirically estimate the costs of different environmental policies for let-
tuce growers in California’s Salinas Valley. They find that mandates reduce farm profits less than do taxes.
9 The assumption of homogeneous firms within a sector means that marginal compliance costs are equated 
across firms (as would policies with tradable credit provisions). Differing marginal compliance costs under non-
tradable mandates would raise overall burdens, but not necessarily have much effect on the distribution of burdens. 
Factor mobility rules out irreversible investment, which could matter for incidence. Such capital is essentially a 
fixed factor that can bear specific burdens, such as on stockholders in that industry.
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the transition period between them. If capital has time to move between sectors, 
then why does it not have time to grow? The best interpretation is not that we move 
from one equilibrium to the other, but that we compare two different states of the 
world—one that has always faced a particular mandate and the other with the same 
capital that has always faced a different mandate.10
The model has two sectors.11 One sector produces a clean good X, with price pX, 
in a constant returns to scale (CRS) function using capital and labor, X = X (KX, LX). 
Totally differentiate this production function and the zero-profits condition, to get
(1)     ˆ   X =  θ XK  ˆ   KX +  θ XL  ˆ   LX 
(2)     ˆ   pX +  ˆ  X =  θ XK ( ˆ   r  +  ˆ   KX ) +  θ XL ( ˆ    w +  ˆ   LX ),
where a hat over any variable represents a proportional change (e.g.,  ˆ  X ≡ dX/X). 
Also, r is the rate of return, w is the wage, and θXi is the share of production for
factor i in sector X (e.g., θXK ≡ rKX/XpX). Then we use the definition of σX, the 
 elasticity of substitution in production between capital and labor to get
(3)  ˆ   KX −  ˆ   LX =  σ X ( ˆ    w −  ˆ   r).
The other sector produces a dirty good y, with price py, in a CRS production func-
tion, y = y(Ky, Ly, Z ).12 Here, we use input demand equations for each of the three 
inputs based on all three input prices (r, w, and pZ). An existing restriction on pol-
lution implies an initial pZ > 0. Differentiate the three input demand equations and 
use the fact that only two of the three are independent to get13
(4)     ˆ    Ky =  a KK  ˆ   r +  a KL  ˆ   w +  a KZ  ˆ   pZ +  ˆ   y
(5)     ˆ    Ly =  a LK  ˆ   r +  a LL  ˆ   w +  a LZ  ˆ   pZ +  ˆ   y,
where aij is the elasticity of demand for factor i with respect to the price of factor 
j. R. G. D. Allen (1938) shows that aij = θy i  eij, where eij is the Allen elasticity of 
10 Using a CGE model, Goulder and Lawrence Summers (1989) analyze transitions due to imperfect factor 
mobility. Adding imperfect mobility or adjustment costs can alter the equilibrium outcome, not just the transition. 
Also, a dynamic model would allow new policies to apply only to new sources or vintages of investment.
11 Aggregation to two sectors is not meant to be “realistic,” but to aid intuition and interpretation, as in the 
original Harberger model. For a disaggregated CGE model of US taxes, Tyler Fox and Fullerton (1991) show that 
key results are almost identical when aggregated to two key sectors. Their focus is on numerical results. Here, we 
focus on analytical solutions and on identifying the primary effects of mandates on factor prices, so the need for 
interpretable results dominates the need for realistic quantitative results.
12 Our model does not distinguish between goods that cause pollution when produced (e.g., electricity) or when 
consumed (e.g., gasoline). This distinction may matter in some models, but not in our case. Our dirty sector’s output 
can be interpreted as the aggregation of electricity and vehicle miles traveled (VMT), where the latter is in effect 
“produced” by the driver using inputs of vehicle (K ), time (L), and pollution (Z ).
13 See Mieszkowski (1972) for an early use of this method. Stability conditions for the input demand system are 
satisfied so long as the own-price elasticities aii are negative, as assumed here.
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 substitution between inputs i and j. For this sector, differentiation of production and 
of the zero-profits condition yield
(6)   ˆ   y =  θ yK  ˆ   Ky +  θ yL  ˆ   Ly +  θ yZ  ˆ   Z ,
(7)  ˆ   py +  ˆ   y =  θ yK ( ˆ   r +  ˆ   Ky ) +  θ yL ( ˆ    w  +  ˆ   Ly ) +  θ yZ (  ˆ   pZ +  ˆ   Z).
The resource constraint for capital is Ky + Ky =  _ K , where  _ K is the fixed total capital 
stock. Differentiation of that and the analogous labor constraint yields
(8)  ˆ   KX λ KX +  ˆ   Ky  λ Ky = 0
(9)  ˆ   LX  λ LX +  L y  λ Ly = 0,
where λij is sector j’s share of input i (e.g.,  λ KX ≡  K X / _ K ). We define γK ≡ Ky/KX 
and γL ≡ Ly/LX, so the dirty sector is capital-intensive whenever (γK − γL) > 0. 
Finally, preferences are modeled using the definition of σu, the elasticity of substitu-
tion in utility:
(10)  ˆ  X −  ˆ   y =  σ u (  ˆ   py −  ˆ   pX ).
The clean good is chosen as numeraire, so  ˆ   pX is fixed at zero, and we have 10 
equations for 11 unknown changes:  ˆ 
 
 KX ,  ˆ 
 
 Ky ,  ˆ  
 
LX ,  ˆ  
 
Ly ,  ˆ 
  w,  ˆ   r,  ˆ 
 
X,  ˆ   py ,  ˆ  
 
y,  ˆ   pZ ,  ˆ  
 
Z. For each policy 
below, we specify one more equation or exogenous policy change. For example, 
authorities can reduce allowed pollution by a small amount (e.g.,  ˆ   Z = – 0.1). The 
system (1)–(10) can then be used to solve for the ten remaining unknowns, by suc-
cessive substitution. The steps are omitted but may be requested from the authors. 
Here, we report only the solutions for  ˆ   r,  ˆ   w,  ˆ   pZ , and  ˆ  
 py . The first three of these deter-
mine the sources-side incidence of the policy, and the last determines the uses-side.14
Because X is produced with no excess profit using only labor and capital, and its 
output price is fixed by assumption, r and w cannot both move in the same direction. 
If  ˆ   r =  ˆ   w = 0, the implication is not that factors bear no burdens. Rather, since py 
may rise,  ˆ   r =  ˆ   w = 0 means that labor and capital bear real burdens in proportion to 
their shares of national income. Hence, a positive value for  ˆ   r just means that capital 
bears a burden that is proportionally less than that of labor.15
The solution for a quantity mandate is presented in the Appendix, from which we 
take the following key intuition (based on Mieszkowski 1967). The “substitution 
effect” includes the term (eKZ − eLZ). It reduces r/w if labor is better than capital 
as a substitute for pollution. The “output effect” includes σu(γK − γL); the mandate 
14 Since total capital and labor are fixed, our model cannot comment on how “green” policies might affect total 
investment or employment. It still sheds light on the “green jobs” debate, however, since we find effects on the 
economy-wide wage (from the overall demand for labor). The claim that environmental policy can favor green jobs 
is more valid if labor is a better substitute for pollution than is capital.
15 Capital’s burden could be small or zero if its quantity could react via long-run savings or via international 
mobility (Jane G. Gravelle and Kent A. Smetters 2006). The big looming problem of climate change may induce 
many or all nations to act, however, reducing capital’s ability to escape the burden.
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raises costs, raises the equilibrium output price, and reduces output in a way that 
depends on consumer preferences σu. It reduces r/w if the dirty industry is capital-
intensive, (γK − γL) > 0.
III. “Performance Standard”: Emissions per unit Output
An alternative form of environmental policy is to limit the ratio of emissions to 
output, a policy we call a “performance standard.” With heterogeneous firm sizes, at 
least some consideration of this ratio seems necessary for a plausible policy. A large 
producer cannot reasonably be expected to achieve the same limit on emissions as 
a small firm. Considerations like these are also taken into account in other policies, 
such as a fixed number of tradable permits that are initially allocated according to 
market share. If firm-specific emission limits are tied to the firm’s output level, even 
implicitly, then the policy may have no absolute limit on total emissions. Instead, 
total emissions vary with total output in a way that affects incentives and prices.16
This model uses the same production functions as the basic model. Behavior in 
the clean sector is unchanged, with equations (1), (2), and (3). Total capital and labor 
are still fixed by equations (8) and (9), and consumer preferences are unchanged in 
(10). The only changes involve incentives facing firms in the dirty sector. Their 
behavior is
  
 
 
   
 max  
 K y ,  L y , Z
 p y y( K y , L y , Z ) − r  K y − w  L  y ,
subject to the constraint Z/y ≤ δ. The firms pay no explicit price for the Z input.17 
Instead, their use of that input is limited by their output. The constraint must bind, 
since the production function is monotone increasing in all inputs. Solving the 
firms’ first-order conditions and rearranging terms yields r =  p y y K /(1 − δ  y Z ) and 
w =  p y y L /(1 − δ y Z ), where subscripts on y denote marginal products. The firm does 
not set the marginal value of an input equal to the input price, as it would without 
the performance standard, because of the denominator in these two equations. This 
denominator is less than one, so the marginal value of the factor is set lower than its 
input price. In other words, the firm wants to proceed further down its factor demand 
curves, using more labor and capital in order to increase output and qualify for an 
increase in valuable emission rights.
Tighter regulation means a decrease in δ. Totally differentiating the production 
function yields an equation analogous to (6) in the previous model:
(6′ )     ˆ   y =  θ yK (1 − ν) ˆ    Ky +  θ yL (1 − ν) ˆ   Ly + ν  ˆ   Z,
16 We consider policies one at a time. If a quantity mandate is imposed on top of another policy, then the combi-
nation may be different from the sum of the parts. If a permit policy already reduces emissions per unit energy, for 
example, then a mandate to do so may be irrelevant (or may merely affect permit price).
17 Firms do pay for fuel, but this input is not the same as “emissions,” as when scrubber technology can reduce 
emissions such as SO2 per unit of fossil fuel. Emissions of CO2 are proportional to fuel use, but absent a carbon tax, 
firms still do not pay for emissions of CO2. We discuss the unpriced input, emissions. To capture all these relation-
ships, we would need a model with an additional input: K, L, Z, and fuel.
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where ν ≡ δ y Z = yZ Z/y. In the basic model with (6), an increase in a factor 
would raise output in proportion to its factor share. Since the marginal product of 
each factor is reduced by (1 − ν), its marginal contribution to output is reduced 
by (1 − ν). An increase in emissions Z raises output in proportion to ν = δyZ, 
to reflect its marginal product yZ and its factor share δ = Z/y. Emission rights 
are valuable, of course, but firms do not pay for them through an explicit price. 
Instead, they pay for emission rights by paying factors more than their marginal 
products.
The assumptions of perfect competition and free entry/exit lead to a zero profit 
condition in the basic model. This condition remains under the policy specified here, 
though it takes a different form. Since costs no longer include the price of emission 
permits, the final term in equation (7) is dropped. The zero profit condition thus 
implies
(7′ )  ˆ   py +  ˆ   y =  θ yK ( ˆ   r +  ˆ   Ky ) +  θ yL ( ˆ    w +  ˆ   Ly ).
The constraint may impose a “shadow price” on the factor Z, but since no explicit 
price is paid for that input, it is not included in the profits equation.18
Finally, we must replace equations (4) and (5) with their counterparts under the 
new policy. Input demand equations can no longer be functions of output and three 
explicit input prices (r, w, pZ). Instead, we write input demand equations as func-
tions of r, w, δ, and y. Then totally differentiate these equations to get:
  ˆ 
 
 Ky =  b KK  ˆ   r +  b KL  ˆ   w +  b KZ  ˆ   δ  +  ˆ   y,
  ˆ  
 
Ly =  b LK  ˆ   r +  b LL  ˆ   w +  b LZ  ˆ   δ  +  ˆ   y,
  ˆ  
 
Z =  b ZK ˆ   r +  b ZL  ˆ   w +  b ZZ  ˆ   δ  +  ˆ   y.
Notice that the bij appear in a form similar to the aij parameters in (4) and (5). They 
both represent input demand elasticities. For example, either aKL or bKL is the percent 
change in capital for a 1 percent change in the wage. However, aKL is that response 
in the first model holding pZ and y constant (so Z can change), while bKL is that 
response in the model holding δ and y constant (so Z = δy cannot change).19
The third equation giving the input demand for Z can be simplified greatly. We 
know that the constraint binds, so Z = δy. Then total differentiation yields
(5′ )  ˆ   Z =  ˆ   δ  +  ˆ   y,
18 This alters the dynamic of firm entry and exit, but since our concern is general equilibrium effects and not the 
transition periods leading up to them, it does not affect our results.
19 The bij elasticities (and the cij elasticities from the following section) are conceptually similar to the direct and 
indirect substitution effects of Masao Ogaki (1990).
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which implies that bZK = bZL = 0, and bZZ = 1. Since only two of the three equa-
tions are independent, we subtract the second equation from the first and get
(4′ )  ˆ   Ky −  ˆ   Ly =  b r  ˆ   r  +  b w  ˆ   w +  b δ  ˆ   δ ,
where br ≡ bKK − bLK, bw ≡ bKL − bLL, and bδ ≡ bKZ − bLZ. In the Web Appendix (also available in the NBER working paper version of this paper), we derive expres-
sions for the bij elasticities in terms of eij and other parameters. Both bKK and bLL are 
negative, since increasing the price of a factor decreases its demand, even with the 
constraint on δ = Z/y. The Web Appendix also shows that the cross-price bij are 
positive (i,  j = K, L), whether or not capital and labor are substitutes as defined by 
the sign of the Allen cross-price elasticity.20 Thus, in (4′ ), a higher wage increases 
the capital/labor ratio (bw > 0), and higher price of capital reduces it (br < 0). In 
fact, that Appendix shows that br = −bw. Finally, it shows that bδ ≡ bKZ − bLZ has 
the opposite sign of eKZ − eLZ. A tighter regulation means δ is decreased, and less 
pollution is allowed per unit output. If capital is a better substitute for pollution 
than is labor, that is, if eKZ > eLZ , then more capital must be used relative to labor (bKZ < bLZ , and hence bδ is negative).
For this model, we now have ten equations: (1), (2), (3), (4′ ), (5′ ), (6′ ), (7′ ), (8), 
(9), and (10). As before, we set  ˆ   pX = 0 and solve for changes in returns to capital 
and labor attributable to a change in the policy (δ ). The solutions are presented in 
Table 2, where the denominator d is positive-definite. Expressions for  ˆ   r and  ˆ   w can 
be decomposed into three terms, each corresponding to a single effect. The last term 
is the “substitution effect,” since it involves bδ ≡ bKZ − bLZ (with sign opposite of 
eKZ − eLZ). A reduction in δ = Z/y raises r if capital is better than labor as a sub-
stitute for emissions (eKZ > eLZ). The second term is the “output effect” including σu(γK − γL). This effect hurts capital if y is capital intensive. Here, however, the first 
term is a new effect we call an “output-subsidy effect:” since the policy mandates a 
lower ratio of pollution to output, it can be satisfied partially by increasing output— 
which helps the factor used intensively.21
Note that the first two terms have opposite signs and differ only by the appear-
ance of σu in the output effect. An intuition is that consumer preferences (σu) affect 
the way in which the higher price reduces demand for the output, but not the firm’s 
incentive to produce more output. Thus, the usual output effect dominates only when 
σu > 1, which raises an important question about the likely size of σu. This param-
eter has never been estimated for this particular aggregation, where the “dirty good” 
20 Why is complementarity ruled out in this case? The Allen elasticities are defined for the input demand func-
tions where all inputs are allowed to vary. Raising the price of labor w may then decrease the demand for capital, if 
the two inputs are complements, but the firm would be forced to increase its other input, pollution. Here, however, 
the third input demand equation ( ˆ   Z =  ˆ   δ +  ˆ   y ) indicates that a change in w, with no change in δ or y, cannot change 
Z. Only labor and capital can vary, so they must be substitutes.
21 In fact, the restriction on Z/y could be modeled as a combination of a tax on emissions plus subsidy to output, 
which might be more consistent with the usual studies of incentive policies. We choose to model mandates directly 
as quantity constraints, however, for several reasons. First, they are quantity constraints. Second, these mandates 
do not raise revenue, so the equivalent incentive policy combination would require a complicated calculation of the 
endogenous output subsidy rate necessary to return all revenue from the emissions tax. Third, we want specifically 
to see what insights can be obtained by tackling the problem of quantity constraints in a way that is different from 
the usual model of incentive policies.
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could represent a composite of gasoline, heating fuel, electricity, and all goods that 
make intensive use of fossil fuels. Yet all of these goods are usually found to have 
relatively low demand elasticities, which would imply that σu is less than one (see 
Section V calibration below). If so, then the new “output-subsidy effect” found here 
dominates the usual output effect, and tighter environmental policy places less bur-
den on the factor that is used intensively in the dirty sector. We have identified a new 
effect that likely reverses the usual output effect, and it indicates the importance of 
further research to estimate σu.
In the equation for  ˆ   py in Table 2, the last term is a “direct effect” that raises the 
price of the dirty good. The rest is an ambiguous “indirect effect.” It is complicated 
by the fact that producers have incentive to sell more of this good, to qualify for 
more pollution rights. The ambiguity can be resolved in special cases.
A. Equal Factor Intensities
Since the output effect and output-subsidy effect operate through differential fac-
tor intensities, the assumption γK = γL = γ makes them both disappear. Then only 
the third term for the substitution effect remains in  ˆ   r and  ˆ   w. The solutions reduce to
  ˆ   r =   θ XL γ  b δ  _  σ X + γ  b w    ˆ  
 δ 
  ˆ   w =  − θ XK γ  b δ _ σ X + γ  b w    ˆ  
 δ 
  ˆ   py =  − ν _ 1 − ν   ˆ  
 δ .
In this case, the factor that is a relative substitute for pollution is burdened less by 
a strengthening of environmental policy ( ˆ   δ  < 0). If labor is the better substitute for 
Table 2—Performance Standard (Restriction on Z/Y)
 ˆ   r​= c − ​θXL ν _
d
 ​ (γK − γL) + ​θXL νσu _ d ​ (γK − γL) + ​θXLη _d ​ bδ d  ˆ  δ 
 ˆ    w​= c θXK ν _
d
 ​ (γK − γL) − ​θXK νσu _ d ​ (γK − γL) −  ​θXKη _d ​ bδd  ˆ  δ 
 ˆ   p​y​ = e 1 _ d ​(θyK θXL − θyLθXK)( − ν(1 − σu)(γK − γL) + ηbδ) − ​ ν _ 1 − ν f  ˆ  δ ,
where η ≡  (θyK γL + θyL γK + γK γL)(1 − ν) > 0 and
d ≡  (1 − ν)σu(θyK θXL − θyL θXK)(γK − γL) + η[bw + σX  (θXL / γK + θXK / γL)] > 0
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pollution (bδ > 0), then the wage rises and the return to capital falls.22 This case 
also provides unambiguous results for incidence on the uses side of income. Only 
the “direct effect” remains in the expression for  ˆ   py . A tightening of environmental 
policy increases the price of the dirty good, hurting those who buy more than aver-
age amounts of it.
B. No Substitution Effect in dirty Sector
We can isolate the effect of factor intensities by assuming away differential sub-
stitution. Instead of setting all cross-price Allen elasticities equal to zero, we set only 
bδ to zero.23 Hence, the substitution effect is eliminated. Then solutions reduce to
  ˆ   r = −  1 _ 
d
   θ XL ν(1 −  σ u )( γ K −  γ L ) ˆ   δ 
  ˆ   w =  1 _ 
d
   θ XK ν(1 −  σ u )( γ K −  γ L ) ˆ   δ 
  ˆ   py = c− ( θ yK θ XL −  θ yL θ XK )ν (1 −  σ u )( γ K −  γ L )  1 _ d  −  ν _ 1 − ν d ˆ  
 δ .
In the first two expressions, we combine the “output effect” and the “output-sub-
sidy effect” from Table 2. If the dirty sector is capital intensive, so that (γK − γL) > 0, 
then capital is hurt more than labor only if σu is greater than one. This special case 
does not remove the ambiguity in  ˆ   py , however.
All of the effects in this paper are summarized in Table 3. For the policy in each 
row, the sign of the term in each cell indicates the sign of that column’s effect on 
the rate of return to capital, r. Because all of these policies restrict Z in some fash-
ion, the substitution effect in the first column always raises r if capital is better than 
labor as a substitute for emissions (eKZ > eLZ). The output effect always raises r if 
the impacted sector is labor intensive (γL > γK). Those two effects follow Harberger (1962) and Mieszkowski (1967), and they still pertain to all mandates here. Yet this 
section has analyzed a restriction in emissions per unit of output (Z/y) and found 
an “output-subsidy effect.” It raises r if the impacted sector is capital intensive. The 
next section analyzes a restriction of emissions per unit of capital (Z/Ky), and it 
identifies another new effect.
IV. “Technology Mandate:” Emissions per Unit Input
Whereas the previous section examines a limit on emissions per unit output, we 
now examine a regulation that limits emissions per unit of an input. Such limits are 
common, as described in our first section above. We have only two clean inputs 
in our model, so we capture the nature of a limit on emissions per unit input by 
22 This intuition could fail with permits, but here the denominator cannot be negative (see the Appendix). 
23 We cannot set all bij to zero, since the Web Appendix shows that some of them are of definite sign.
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 modeling a limit on emissions per unit of capital. We refer to this policy as a “tech-
nology mandate,” since forcing the adoption of a particular technology in produc-
tion may effectively fix the emissions/capital ratio.24 Capital and labor are each in 
fixed supply and mobile between sectors, so they are perfectly symmetric in this 
model. Thus, the results for a limit per unit labor can be obtained directly from 
results below by interchanging every K and L (as well as every w and r).
As with the earlier policy, the equations that describe the behavior of consum-
ers and of producers of the clean good do not change here. Equations (1), (2), (3), 
(8), (9), and (10) fall into this category and are applicable to this section. The only 
aspect of the model that requires revision is the behavior of producers of the dirty 
good. Consider their maximization problem. As in the previous policy, firms pay no 
explicit price for the pollution input. Instead, they face an exogenous ceiling on their 
ratio of emissions to capital. Formally, this problem is
  
 
 
   
 max  
 K y  ,  L y  , Z
  p y y( K y ,  L y , Z ) − r  K y − w L y 
subject to the constraint Z/Ky ≤ ζ. A tightening of environmental policy is defined 
as a decrease in ζ. It is clear that the policy constraint binds. Since firms pay no price 
per unit of pollution, and this input is productive, they will employ as much of it as 
possible, an amount Z = ζKy. Thus, we use the fact that ∂Z/∂Ky = ζ. The first-order 
conditions for the maximization problem are
 r = py (yK + ζ yZ)
 w = py  yL.
The second of these equations is identical to the first-order condition in the 
basic model where firms face a price for all three inputs and no other constraint: 
the  marginal value of labor is equal to the wage. The first equation differs from the 
standard condition. For the choice of capital input demanded, the marginal value 
24 Of course, actual technology mandates are more complicated. They may require a particular technology and 
thus inhibit innovation, or they may encourage or require innovation (e.g., required fuel efficiency targets for which 
the technology is not yet available). Our paper is not about the uncertain effects on technological change, but about 
distributional incidence. If “ability to innovate” is a skill, modeled as a factor of production, then either type of 
technology mandate may reward or punish such a factor.
Table 3—The Sign of Each Effect on the Rate of Return to Capitala
Type of restriction
Substitution
effect
Output
effect
Output-subsidy
 effect
Capital-subsidy
effect
Quantityb Z eK Z − eL Z (γL − γK)
Ratio Z/y eK Z − eL Z (γL − γK) (γK − γL)
Ratio Z/Ky eK Z − eL Z (γL − γK) (γK − γL) eK L − eK K
a The effect on the wage rate always has the opposite sign.
b The quantity policy is considered in the Appendix.
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of capital yK is lower than the rental rate (since ζ yZ is positive). The intuition here 
is that each unit of capital employed gives value to the firm in two ways. First, 
it increases their output directly (since yK > 0). Second, it allows more pollution, 
which also increases output. The second term represents this effect, since yZ is the 
marginal product of pollution, and ζ = ∂ Z/∂Ky is the pollution increase made pos-
sible by the increased capital. The value of investing in a marginal unit of capital 
is composed of these two terms and at the optimum is set equal to the cost of that 
investment, the rental rate r.
Totally differentiate the production function and substitute in these first-order 
conditions. After dividing through by y, we have
(6′′ )    ˆ   y = ( θ yK −  ν)  ˆ    Ky +  θ yL  ˆ   Ly + ν  ˆ   Z .
The constant ν is still equal to yZ Z/y, as in the previous section. Also, as before, 
an increase in any one input does not generally increase output by a proportion 
equal to its factor share. This condition does hold for labor in (6′′ ), since that input 
choice is not distorted, but the constraint does distort the choice of capital. Yet, 
from (6′′ ), we see that a 1 percent increase in all three inputs yields a 1 percent 
increase in output, from the assumption of constant returns to scale. The zero 
profit condition still holds as well, even though firms do not pay for pollution, 
because entry and exit are still allowed. Thus, equation (7′ ) from the prior model 
also applies to this one.
Finally, the dirty sector’s chosen amount of each input (Ky, Ly, and Z ) depends on 
input prices, the policy parameter, and output (r, w, ζ, and y ). We totally differenti-
ate these input demand equations to get
  ˆ 
 
 Ky =  c KK  ˆ   r +  c KL  ˆ   w +  c KZ  ˆ   ζ  +  ˆ   y
  ˆ  
 
Ly =  c LK  ˆ   r  +  c LL  ˆ   w +  c LZ  ˆ   ζ  +  ˆ   y
  ˆ  
 
Z =  c ZK  ˆ   r +  c ZL  ˆ   w +  c ZZ  ˆ   ζ  +  ˆ   y.
The elasticity of demand for input i with respect to price j is defined here as cij (but 
this response depends on the nature of the constraint, so the cij elasticities are not 
the same as the aij or bij elasticities). Only two of these equations are independent of 
each other, so we subtract each of the bottom two equations from the top one to get 
two equations to use in our solution. The first of these equations is
(4′′ )  ˆ   Ky −  ˆ   Ly =  c r  ˆ   r +  c w  ˆ   w +  c ζ  ˆ   ζ ,
where cr ≡ cKK − cLK, cw ≡ cKL − cLL, and cζ ≡ cKZ − cLZ. The second resulting 
equation can be simplified using the policy constraint Z/Ky = ζ, since total differ-
entiation gives
(5′′ )  ˆ   Ky −  ˆ   Z = − ˆ   ζ .
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Substituting this into the equations above implies that cKK − cZK = 0, cKL − cZL= 0, and cK Z − cZ Z = −1. These relationships are verified in the Web Appendix.
Also in that Appendix, we evaluate the elasticities of input demand. An impor-
tant condition for their signs relates to the relative complementarity of capital and 
pollution:
 “Condition 1”: eKZ > (eKK + eZZ)/2.
The right-hand side of this inequality must be negative, since all own-price elastici-
ties are negative. This condition always holds, then, when capital and pollution are 
substitutes (eKZ > 0). It also holds when capital and pollution are not “too comple-
mentary.” With this condition, the Web Appendix shows that cr < 0 and cw > 0. That 
is, an increase in the capital rental rate must reduce the ratio Ky/Ly demanded, and 
an increase in the wage must increase it. The ratio of Z to Ky is fixed, and so produc-
ers really have only two inputs between which they can substitute; once they choose 
Ky and Ly, then Z is given by the constraint. With only two inputs Ky and Ly, they 
must be substitutes.25
The system of equations containing (1), (2), (3), (4′′ ), (5′′ ), (6′′ ), (7′ ), (8), (9), 
and (10) are ten equations in ten unknowns. In Table 4, these equations are solved 
for the proportional change in each price from an exogenous change in ζ. When 
condition 1 holds, the denominator d must be positive.
These equations are strikingly similar to their counterparts for the previous pol-
icy. As before, the second term in either factor price equation is an “output effect:” 
this policy impinges on the dirty sector, which tends to raise the output price and 
discourage purchases. By itself, this effect would hurt capital if the sector is capital 
intensive. Again, the first term is an “output-subsidy effect” with the opposite sign. 
Again, it is larger than the output effect if σu < 1. In the prior case, however, the 
output-subsidy effect arises because the mandate to reduce Z/y provides an implicit 
subsidy to output. Why is output subsidized here? As we show in a moment, this 
mandate to reduce Z/Ky provides an implicit subsidy to the use of capital Ky, but 
this subsidy itself also reduces the cost of production, and therefore it also creates 
an output-subsidy effect.
The third term in these factor price equations depends on cζ, which the Web 
Appendix shows can itself be subdivided. In particular, it shows that cζ can be 
written:
  c ζ = m + h( e LZ −  e KZ ) + h( e KK −  e KL ),
where m and h are defined in that Appendix and are both positive under condition 1. 
In this expression, the last term is the promised “capital-subsidy effect.” It includes 
25 If condition 1 fails, then eKZ < (eKK + eZZ)/2 < 0, so cr > 0 and cw < 0. Counterintuitively, an increase in r/w 
then raises the desired Ky/Ly ratio. Because capital and pollution are highly complementary, the increase in r makes 
firms want less K and less Z. Wanting less Z reduces the pressure of the constraint (Z/Ky ≤ ζ), which reduces the 
shadow price on Z (i.e., the right to emit is not so valuable). The reduced shadow price on Z, by itself, would mean 
more demand for Z and more Ky, since they are complements. If they are sufficiently complementary, then the result 
is a net increase in capital relative to labor.
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eKK, which is always negative, so the policy ( ˆ   ζ < 0) has a positive effect on the use 
of capital and its return r. It also includes −eKL, which operates in the same direction 
if labor and capital are substitutes (eKL > 0). The extent to which dirty firms can sub-
stitute away from labor and into capital helps drive up demand for K, and thus the 
return r. As shown in Table 3, the capital-subsidy effect raises r if ( e KK −  e KL ) < 0.
The second term in the cζ expression represents the usual “substitution effect:” 
the mandate to reduce the ratio ζ can also be satisfied partly by reducing Z in the 
numerator, which means substituting from Z into other inputs (K or L). If labor is a 
better substitute for pollution than capital (eLZ > eKZ), then this policy induces more 
demand for labor than capital from the substitution effect. Then this term is positive, 
so multiplication by  ˆ  
 ζ < 0 means that it decreases r and increases w.
In summary, the forced reduction in Z/Ky can be satisfied partly by reducing 
emissions in the numerator (the substitution effect), but also partly by increasing 
capital in the denominator (the capital-subsidy effect). This implicit subsidy itself 
reduces the cost of production (the output-subsidy effect), which offsets the usual 
way in which regulations raise costs (the output effect). All four effects appear in 
Table 3.
A. Equal Factor Intensities
The assumption γK = γL = γ eliminates the output and output-subsidy effects in 
Table 4. The factor price equations do not need to be repeated here, as they then 
contain only the third term with cζ (including both the substitution effect and the 
capital-subsidy effect). However, the output price equation reduces to
  ˆ   py = − ν  ˆ   ζ .
On the uses side, incidence is unambiguous. A tighter environmental policy must 
increase the price of the dirty good relative to the price of the clean good, due to the 
direct effect of the policy on the cost of production in the y sector only.
Table 4—Technology Mandate (Restriction on Z/KY)
 ˆ   r​= c − ​θXL ν _
d
 ​ (γK − γL) + ​θXL νσu _ d ​ (γK − γL) + ​θXLπ _d ​ cζ d ˆ   ζ 
 ˆ   w​ = c θXK ν _
d
 ​ (γK − γL) − ​θXK νσu _ d ​ (γK − γL) − ​θXKπ _d ​ cζd ˆ   ζ 
 ˆ   p​y​ = e 1 _ d ​(θyK θXL − θyLθXK)( − ν (1 − σu)(γK − γL) + π cζ) − νf ˆ   ζ ,
where π =  γL γK + θyK γL +   θyL γK > 0, and
d ≡ σu(θyK θXL − θyL θXK)(γK − γL) − π(θXL cr − θXK cw) +  σX  (θXK  γK + θXL γL + θyK + θyL)
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B. No Substitution Effect in dirty Sector
Here, we assume that cr = cw = cζ = 0, which is not quite as strong as saying 
that the dirty sector cannot substitute at all.26 Instead, this assumption eliminates the 
capital-subsidy effect and the substitution effect. The remaining factor price equa-
tions are straight from Table 4, but without the last term (cζ ). Thus, they still include 
the output effect and the output-subsidy effect.
The output price equation also looks much like the one in Table 4, but without the 
cζ term. The last term (−ν) is definitely negative, so this “direct effect” raises the 
cost of production and thus raises the breakeven price py. The long first term is an 
indirect effect. Since γK − γL has the same sign as (θyK θXL − θyL θXK), this term has 
the opposite sign of (1 − σu). When σu is smaller than one, then a tighter mandate 
must increase the price of good y. When σu is large, however, the indirect effect can 
dominate the direct effect, so that a tighter mandate decreases the price of the dirty 
good.27
V. Numerical Magnitudes
We now employ plausible parameter values to quantify effects identified above. 
We stress that our main contribution is the analytical model, but some quantification 
can help complement those results. Because the model abstracts from a number of 
important features of the economy and of environmental policy, we do not expect 
these calculations to provide accurate point estimates of the size of general equilib-
rium effects of mandates. Instead, we only hope to provide some general idea about 
relative magnitudes. Note that the regulation of a single industry would likely have 
small general equilibrium impacts. Therefore, the best interpretation of our analy-
sis is not about any one regulation, but about all environmental regulation of dirty 
industries taken together.
Our calibration uses parameter values from Fullerton and Heutel (2007). As 
described in more detail there, we divide the US economy into “clean” and “dirty” 
sectors based on industry-level emissions reported to the EPA’s 2002 Toxic Release 
Inventory (TRI).28 Other industry-level data on capital and labor inputs imply that 
the dirty sector accounts for 20 percent of factor income, and that the K/L ratio in 
both sectors is 2/3. When we set total labor and capital income to 1.0, and pollu-
tion’s share of the value of output in the dirty industry (θyZ) to 0.25, we calculate 
the initial factor allocations shown in Table 5. That table also presents the assumed 
26 In fact, all cij cannot be zero, since we showed earlier that cKZ − cZZ = −1.
27 In the  ˆ   py equation, for a large indirect effect, suppose σu and (γK − γL) are large. The sector is highly capital 
intensive. The output effect dominates the output-subsidy effect, so the tighter mandate means less demand for 
capital. Thus, r falls. As seen in the  ˆ   r equation, large σu and (γK − γL) mean r falls a lot. The dirty sector is highly 
capital intensive, so its cost of production and py fall.
28 The TRI database includes emissions of toxic chemicals from industry, not carbon dioxide from industry nor 
any emissions from consumer use of fossil fuel. Yet, the dirty sector output could be defined to include vehicle miles 
traveled, which would require refinements of these data. Of course, the magnitudes used here are only meant to be 
suggestive in any case, and we vary the numbers in sensitivity analysis below. 
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elasticity of substitution in the clean sector σX, the elasticity of substitution in utility σu, and the cross-price Allen elasticities.29
Using the definition of σu and log-linearization of the consumer’s budget, we can 
show that the price elasticity of demand for y is −[α + σu(1 − α)], where α is its 
expenditure share. Our implied α is 0.25, so σu = 0.8 corresponds to − 0.85 for the 
price elasticity.30
The values in Table 5 are used to set all other “base case” parameters.31 Then the 
Allen elasticities determine input demand elasticities bij for the performance stan-
dard and cij for the technology mandate.
32 Using all those parameters in equations 
above, we calculate the effect of each policy on the wage rate and the capital rental 
rate.
The initial ratio of pollution to output (δ ) is smaller than its ratio to capital (ζ ), so 
the same 10 percent reduction in both ratios does not have the same scale of impacts 
on the economy. Instead, for comparability, we calculate the change in each ratio 
that achieves the same 10 percent cut in pollution ( ˆ   Z ). For base case parameters, this 
same stringency is achieved by a 7.8 percent reduction in δ or 13.6 percent reduc-
tion in ζ. For different parameter values used in Table 6, though, it is achieved by a 
29 These elasticities have not been estimated, but some studies suggest that capital may be a better substitute 
for pollution than is labor (Ruud A. DeMooij and Bovenberg 1998; Timothy Considine and Donald Larson 2006).
30 West and Williams (2004) estimate gasoline price elasticities in the range of − 0.18 to − 0.73. Kenneth Small 
and Kurt Van Dender’s (2007) estimates are between − 0.4 and − 0.6. In a meta-analysis of long-run price elasticity 
estimates for electricity demand, James A. Espey and Molly Espey (2004) find “a range from − 2.25 to − 0.04 with 
a mean of − 0.85 and a median of − 0.81” (p. 66). We vary this parameter in sensitivity analysis.
31 For example, θXK ≡ KX/(KX + LX) = 0.32/(0.32 + 0.48) = 0.40. Also, θyK eiK + θyL eiL + θyZ eiZ = 0 (for 
i = K, L, Z), as shown by Allen (1938), so the cross-price elasticities can then be used to set own-price elasticities, 
eii.
32 As shown in the Web Appendix, the bij and cij input demand elasticities are functions of factor shares (the θ’s), prices (all normalized to one), the three first derivatives of production (yK, yL, and yZ), and six second deriva-
tives. Because each marginal product matches its factor price, set at one, the first derivatives also equal one. The 
definitions of the six Allen elasticities are eij ≡ [( pyy )/(iy jy)] (Fij/F), where F is the determinant of the bordered 
Hessian of the production function, and Fij is the cofactor of element i, j. These six equations are functions of the 
six unknown second derivatives of production and are solved numerically for the second derivatives, which are then 
substituted into the definitions for the bij and cij elasticities.
 Table 5—Base Case Parameter Values
Factor intensity parameters Ky 0.08
Ly 0.12
KX 0.32
LX 0.48
γK 0.25
γL 0.25
θyZ 0.25
Elasticity of substitution in X σX 1.0
Elasticity of substitution in utility σu 0.8
Allen elasticities in the dirty sector eKL 0.5
e KZ 0.5
eLZ 0.3
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reduction in δ ranging from 7.5 percent to 8.1 percent, or a reduction in ζ ranging 
from 9.5 percent to 16.7 percent. For the base case, where γK − γL = 0, neither sec-
tor is more capital-intensive. Thus, both the output effect and output-subsidy effect 
are zero. For the performance standard, the only effect remaining is the substitution 
effect, which reduces the wage/rental ratio because eK Z > eL Z (capital is a better 
substitute for pollution than is labor). Thus, the wage falls by 0.12 percent, and the 
return to capital rises 0.18 percent. For the technology mandate, the substitution 
effect is augmented by the capital-subsidy effect. Both raise the return to capital (by 
0.73 percent) relative to the wage (which falls by 0.49 percent). These factor price 
changes might seem small, for a pollution reduction of 10 percent, but note that pol-
lution is only 25 percent of the value of y, which itself is only 20 percent of GDP. 
This 10 percent pollution mandate in one small sector has nearly 1 percent effects 
on all labor and capital.
Rows 2– 4 vary only the relative cross-price elasticities. When eK Z is much greater 
than eL Z, as in row 2, the substitution effect is pronounced, and the increase in the 
rental rate  ˆ   r is even higher than in the base case, for both policies. In row 3, the 
elasticities are reversed (eK Z < eL Z), so labor is a better substitute for pollution. Now, 
the substitution effect goes in the opposite direction, and the wage increases. Row 4 
presents the case where eK Z = eL Z, so the substitution effect disappears. The output 
effect and output-subsidy effect are already zero (since γK – γL = 0), so the per-
formance standard has no effect whatsoever on the wage or the rental rate. For the 
technology mandate, the only remaining effect is the capital-subsidy effect, which 
increases the rental rate (because the demand for capital increases to help reduce the 
ratio Z/Ky).
Next, we vary the elasticity of substitution in utility, σu, which determines the rel-
ative strength of the output effect (because it is always multiplied by γK − γL in the 
equations). But this output effect is zero in the first four rows, where γK − γL = 0, 
so rows 5 and 6 set γK − γL = 0.1 (the dirty sector is capital-intensive). The output 
effect serves to decrease the rental rate and increase the wage, while the output-
subsidy effect works in the opposite direction. When σu < 1, we show above that the 
output-subsidy dominates, so the net of these two effects raises the rental rate. Thus, 
r rises more in row 5 with σu = 0.6 than in row 6, where σu = 1. Indeed, these two 
Table 6—Sensitivity Analysis, Where Each Policy Achieves 10 Percent Less Pollution 
(all other parameters the same as in the base case)
Parameters Performance standard Technology mandate
Row γK − γL e KZ eLZ σu  ˆ   w (%)  ˆ   r (%)  ˆ   w (%)  ˆ   r (%)
1 0 0.5 0.3 0.8 −0.12 0.18 −0.49 0.73
2 0 1.0 0 0.8 −0.59 0.89 −0.81 1.22
3 0 0 1.0 0.8 0.40 −0.59 0.17 −0.25
4 0 0.5 0.5 0.8 0.00 0.00 −0.25 0.38
5 0.1 0.5 0.3 0.6 −0.16 0.26 −0.49 0.80
6 0.1 0.5 0.3 1.0 −0.11 0.18 −0.39 0.63
7 −0.2 0.5 0.3 0.8 −0.07 0.09 −0.53 0.68
8 −0.1 0.5 0.3 0.8 −0.10 0.14 −0.52 0.72
9 0.1 0.5 0.3 0.8 −0.13 0.22 −0.44 0.71
10 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.8 −0.14 0.25 −0.38 0.67
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effects cancel out when σu = 1, leaving only the substitution effect and the capital-
subsidy effect.
Rows 7–10 raise the value of γK − γL in steps from − 0.2 to + 0.2, so the dirty 
sector changes from labor-intensive to capital-intensive (keeping fixed the overall 
size of X, y,  
_ K , and  _ L ). These rows all employ σu = 0.8, which is less than one, so 
the output-subsidy effect dominates the output effect. Therefore, as the dirty sector 
becomes more capital-intensive, we expect more increase in the relative rental rate 
(higher  ˆ   r −  ˆ   w). This result certainly holds for the performance standard, in Table 6, 
where w falls more and r rises more (from row 7 to row 10). For the technology 
mandate, however,  ˆ   r −  ˆ   w becomes smaller from row 8 to row 10. The reason is that 
the output effect and the output-subsidy effect in this case are joined by the capital-
subsidy effect. As we show next, this capital-subsidy effect becomes smaller as the 
dirty sector becomes more capital-intensive, offsetting the other three effects.
To understand these effects separately, Table 7 shows the breakdown of effects 
on  ˆ   r for each policy. The first two rows show the base case, where γK − γL = 0, 
so neither policy has an output effect or an output-subsidy effect. For the perfor-
mance standard, only the substitution effect remains to explain the finding above 
that  ˆ   r = 0.18 percent. For the technology mandate, Table 6 shows  ˆ   r = 0.73 percent 
in the base case, which Table 7 reveals is composed of both a substitution effect 
(0.11 percent) and capital-subsidy effect (0.61 percent).
The rest of Table 7 varies γK − γL from – 0.2 to + 0.2 (as in rows 7 and 10 of Table 
6). When γK − γL = – 0.2, the dirty sector is labor-intensive, so the output effect helps 
capital, but the output-subsidy effect more than offsets (because σu < 1). For the 
performance standard, the net negative contribution of these two effects is dominated 
by the positive substitution effect, so that the overall net effect is positive (0.09 per-
cent). For the technology mandate, those three terms add to approximately zero, and 
the positive capital-subsidy effect accounts for the bulk of the net effect. Finally, in 
the last two rows, where γK − γL = 0.2, the dirty sector is capital intensive. Thus, the 
output effect on r is negative, while the output-subsidy effect is positive (and larger).
VI. Conclusion
Just like taxes, regulations that restrict emissions affect producer decisions about 
use of labor and capital, and they thus affect relative factor prices, total production, 
and output prices. Existing models analyze the distribution of burdens from taxes, 
Table 7—Numerical Decomposition of Effects on the Return to Capital 
(each policy achieves 10 percent less pollution; all other parameters same as in the base case)
Subst. 
effect
Output 
effect
Output-subsidy 
effect
Capital-subsidy 
effect
Net 
effect
γK – γL = 0(base case) Perf. standard 0.18 0 0 — 0.18Tech. mandate 0.11 0 0 0.61 0.73
γK – γL = – 0.2 Perf. standard 0.14 0.21 −0.26 — 0.09
Tech. mandate 0.08 0.35 −0.44 0.69 0.68
γK – γL = + 0.2 Perf. standard 0.19 −0.23 0.29 — 0.25
Tech. mandate 0.13 −0.28 0.35 0.48 0.67
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but this paper points out that nonrevenue-raising restrictions also have burdens on 
the sources side of income through changes in factor prices as well as burdens on 
the uses side through changes in output prices. Our model is based on the standard 
 two-sector tax incidence model, but with two important modifications. First, we 
allow one sector to include pollution as a factor of production that can be a comple-
ment or substitute for labor or for capital. Second, we look not at taxes, but at dif-
ferent types of mandates.
The model in this paper can be applied beyond environmental policy to analyze 
any regulation that restricts use of inputs. Alternatively, the model could be extended 
in any of the many ways that the Harberger model has been extended, for example 
to consider more realistic market structures, asymmetric information about costs 
and benefits of pollution abatement, irreversible investments, or adjustment costs. 
Future research in a dynamic model could consider capital formation, endogenous 
technology, vintage-differentiated regulation, and uncertainty. Also important is the 
interaction of environmental mandates with other types of regulation, especially in 
the highly regulated electric utility sector. Finally, we focus on the incidence of the 
costs of environmental mandates; a large parallel literature instead examines the 
incidence of benefits (e.g., policy may reduce pollution in poorer neighborhoods 
more than in richer neighborhoods).
With any of those extensions, the model would become more complicated, and 
the price change equations might have more terms. But the effects we have uncov-
ered here would still pertain. With no existing research on these effects yet, we 
believe that this simple model is the right place to begin.  And even in this simple 
model, we get some interesting results. First, a mandate may hurt consumers of the 
clean good more than consumers of the dirty good. Second, we show how a man-
date may burden either the factor that is a better substitute for pollution or the factor 
that is a relative complement to pollution. Third, restrictions on the absolute level 
of emissions differ from restrictions on emissions per unit output or per unit of an 
input. A restriction on pollution per unit of output has not only an “output effect” 
that burdens any factor used intensively in production, but also an “output-subsidy 
effect” that encourages output to help satisfy the mandated ratio. Similarly, a restric-
tion on pollution per unit capital creates a “capital-subsidy effect” that increases 
demand for capital and thus raises the rental rate.
An implication is that researchers need to be careful about the nature of an envi-
ronmental restriction before concluding that it injures the factor used intensively or 
the factor that is a better substitute for pollution. Those usual effects can be com-
pletely offset by other effects we identify in this paper.
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Appendix: Tradable Pollution Permits
The permit policy imposes costs by forcing firms to reduce emissions or to buy 
permits. The mandated overall limit on pollution creates scarcity rents, however, 
and the distribution of those rents is part of the incidence.33 If the permits are 
 grandfathered to firms, then their owners capture the scarcity rents. In addition to 
evaluating changes in returns to capital and labor, our model solves for changes in 
permit-created scarcity rents. All of these changes contribute to the sources-side 
incidence.
General solutions are presented in Table A1, where we assume the denominator 
d is positive.34 The factor price equations demonstrate effects first identified by 
Mieszkowski (1967). The first term in the curly brackets, σu(γK − γL), is his “out-
put effect.” The policy  ˆ  
 
Z < 0 raises the cost of production and thus reduces output 
in a way that depends on consumer preferences σu. Then if y is capital intensive, 
33 Parry (2004) uses a partial equilibrium model to calculate incidence, including the distribution of scarcity 
rents created by emissions permits for carbon, SOX, and NOX.
34 The denominator is likely to be positive, except in perverse cases that are not the subject of this paper. In the 
case with equal factor intensities (γK = γL = γ), for example, a sufficient condition is that all of the Allen cross-
price elasticities are positive. In fact, that condition is stronger than necessary. d is positive unless
“Condition A1”: eKL <  −σX [θyZ σu + (θXL γ + θyL) eLZ + (θXK γ + θyK)eKZ] − AθXLθyK (geKK + FeLL)  ______    AθXLθyK (F + g)   .
The right side of this inequality must be negative, so Condition A1 says that eKL is even more negative. Thus, d > 0 
does not require that K and L are substitutes, but only that they not be “too complementary.”
Table A1—Incidence of Absolute Quantity Restriction
 ˆ   r =  θyZ θXL _ 
d
  {σu(γK − γL) − eKZ  γK (1 + γL) + eLZ  γL(1 + γK)}  ˆ   Z,
 ˆ   w =  θyZ  θXK _ 
d
  { − σu(γK − γL)  +  eKZ  γK (1 + γL) − eLZ  γL (1 + γK)}  ˆ   Z,
 ˆ   pZ = F − 1 ea 1 _ d  b AgγL(1 + γK) − FγK(1 + γL)B a σX _ A  (c + βL) + θyL θXK (eKL − eKK)b −  γL(1 + γK) _A  f  ˆ  Z
 ˆ   py = e[gγL(1  +  γK) − FγK(1  +  γL)] c θyZ _ d  (θyK  θXL − θyL  θXK) +  σX  (c + βL) + AθyL θXK(eKL − eKK)   ___ AFd  d
  − θyZ   γL (1 + γK) _
FA
  f  ˆ   Z,
where γL   ≡   λLy _ λLX  =  
Ly _ 
LX
 > 0,  γK ≡   λKy _ λKX  =  
Ky _ 
KX
 > 0,  βK ≡  θXK γK + θyK > 0,
βL ≡  θXL γL + θyL > 0,  A ≡  γL βK + γK βL > 0,  c ≡ βK  θyL − βL θyK,
F ≡ σu  a γL(1 − θyK) − γK θyL  __ A  b  +  eKZ,  g ≡ σu  a γK(1 − θyL) − γLθyK  __ A  b  +  eLZ,  and
 d ≡ σu[θyK  θXL − θyL  θXK]  Sg AA − γL(1 + γK)B − F AA − γK  (1 + γL)BT
 + σX[g(c + βL) + F(βK − c)] + AθXL  θyK[FeKL − geKK] − AθyL  θXK[FeLL − geKL]
86 AmErIcAN EcoNomIc JourNAL: EcoNomIc PoLIcy AuguSt 2010
(γK − γL) > 0, the output effect reduces r and raises w. The other terms represent a 
“substitution effect” involving the Allen elasticities. If capital is a better substitute 
for pollution than is labor (eKZ > eLZ), then the restriction  ˆ   Z < 0 is more likely to 
help capital.
Next, in Table A1, the expression for  ˆ   pZ seems quite complicated, but the final 
term inside the curly brackets, γL(1 + γK)/A, is unambiguously positive and could 
be called a “direct effect.” It reflects a downward-sloping demand for emissions 
 permits, so the leftward shift of the vertical supply curve tends to raise the equilib-
rium permit price. Then the long first term could be called the “indirect effect,” but 
it need not be positive. If it is sufficiently negative, then a decrease in the total permit 
allocation may actually decrease the permit price. The conditions under which this 
counterintuitive effect occurs are quite cumbersome and difficult to interpret, and 
hence they are not presented here. Yet the effect is analogous to previous findings 
that an increase in the pollution tax can lead to an increase in emissions.35
Yet, unlike the incidence on labor and capital owners, the incidence on permit 
holders is not determined solely by the change in their factor price. Labor and capi-
tal are in fixed total supply and earn net returns determined by w and r, but the 
supply of permits has just been restricted by the policy ( ˆ   Z < 0). The total return to 
permit holders is pZ Z, and the proportional change in this product is  ˆ  
 pZ +  ˆ   Z. Even if 
the policy raises the price pZ, then permit holders are still not necessarily better off.
Furthermore, even the uses-side incidence result (  ˆ   py ) is ambiguous. The final 
term in the curly brackets is a “direct effect” on the cost of production, indicating 
that a decrease in the number of permits tends to increase the price of the dirty good. 
However, the long previous term is an “indirect effect” that cannot be signed. It 
allows for another counterintuitive result: reducing the number of emissions permits 
may hurt consumers of the clean good more than consumers of the dirty good.
A. Equal Factor Intensities
Suppose that γL and γK are equal to each other, and let their common value be γ. 
Note that this condition implies Ly/LX = Ky/KX. The output effect then disappears, 
and the substitution effect simplifies. Unfortunately, this special case does little to 
simplify the long expressions for  ˆ   pZ and  ˆ  
 py , but for factor prices we have
  ˆ   r = −  θyZ  θXL _ 
d
  γ (1 + γ)(eKZ − eLZ) ˆ   Z
  ˆ   w =  θyZ  θXK _ 
d
  γ (1 + γ)(eKZ − eLZ) ˆ   Z .
35 See DeMooij and Bovenberg (1998) or Fullerton and Heutel (2007). This example is comparable to the 
“Edgeworth Taxation Paradox” studied in Harold Hotelling (1932), where the imposition of a tax on a good can 
reduce its price to consumers and increase their purchases. Though Hotelling’s (1932) model is not perfectly 
analogous to the one here, his inequalities (25) and (26) present conditions when the paradox holds; they similarly 
involve cross-price demand elasticities.
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The denominator in the general solution reduces a bit, but d > 0 still requires condi-
tion A1. If so, we reach a definitive conclusion about the effect of the regulation on 
r and w. When emissions must be reduced, the dirty sector wants to substitute into 
both labor and capital, but if labor is a better substitute for pollution (eLZ > eKZ), then 
labor is hurt relatively less (i.e.,  ˆ   r < 0 and  ˆ   w > 0).
B. No Substitution in dirty Sector
We now let the factor intensities of the two sectors differ but assume the dirty sec-
tor cannot substitute among its inputs (eij = 0 for all i, j). While this assumption is 
clearly restrictive, it allows us to isolate the impact of factor intensities. The denomi-
nator d then simplifies to θyZ σX σu, and the substitution effects in  ˆ   r and  ˆ   w disappear. 
Again,  ˆ   pZ and  ˆ  
 py are not much simplified, but the changes in factor prices become
  ˆ   r =  θXL _ σX   (γK − γL) ˆ  
 
Z
  ˆ   w = −  θXK _ σX  (γK − γL) ˆ  
 
Z. 
Here, the denominator is always positive. The sources side incidence includes only 
an output effect, determined by the sign of γK − γL. If the dirty sector is capital-
intensive, this term is positive. Since  ˆ  
 
Z < 0, the rental rate falls and the wage rises. 
The magnitude of this effect is mediated by σX. If the clean industry can easily sub-
stitute between capital and labor, then these effects on input prices become smaller, 
since the clean sector can easily accommodate the additional labor or capital.
Finally, instead of tradable permits, consider a policy where each firm faces a 
restriction on Z. Then, pollution has no market clearing price pZ, but each firm with 
a restriction on Z can be said to face a shadow price pZ. Each firm gets an allocation 
of permits that are not tradable. In our model with many identical firms, however, 
the firms cannot gain from trade. With constant returns to scale, each firm’s labor 
and capital can adjust to its allocation of nontradable permits in a way that is equiva-
lent to the transfer of permits to some other firm using that same labor and capital. 
In other words, firm-specific restrictions on pollution levels in this model yield the 
same results as for tradable permits. Equations above can be used for effects on total 
dirty-industry use of labor and capital and for consequent economy-wide returns.
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